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Edward Chace Tolman's SignGestalt Theory Of Learning
by Sister M. Michel Keenan, I.H.M.

Edward Chace Tolman was born in West Newton, Massachusetts, on
April 14, 1886. He studied at Massachusetts Institute of Technology in
Cambridge, and received his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1915. He afterward taught at Northwestern University until 1918, then at the University of California, Berkeley, until retirement in 1954. His major work
is Purposive BehavioT in Animals and Men ( 1932 ). The entire bibliography of his writings is found in a 1951 publication entitled Collected
Papers in Psychology. Another biography and bibliography of Tolman
is found in the American Psychologis~ volume 13: 155-158, (1958).
Tolman died in Berkeley, California, on November 19, 1959.
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Keenan: Edward Chace Tolman's Sign-Gestalt Theory of Learning
The name of Edward Chace Tolman has been finding its way into the literature of
learning theory for some fifty years now, either by way of original contributions
from the man himself, totalling over eighty in number, or through collected works
in the psychology of learning by other authors desirous of bringing Tolman's SignGestalt theory into the focus of public thought.
In the Sign-Gestalt theory of learning one is faced with the fascinating, yet
profoundly difficult case of a terminology which is Scholastic in tone, embodied in
a theory in which new meanings are given to the old, familiar terms. Students of
Thomistic orientation in psychology may be most readily misled by this language
difficulty in Tolman. Concern over this semantic pitfall motivated the writer's study
of Tolman.
Having been introduced to learning theory by a consideration of the extremely
mechanistic systems of Thorndike, Guthrie and Hull (which is the usual textbook
arrangement), students generally welcome the more humanistic framework of field
theory; and it is understandable that they may be easily led from the observation
of such terms as " pu r posive," " cognitive," " means-end-expectation, " " conscious activity," " inventive ideation," etc. - all of which are found in Tolman's theoretical
vocabulary - to conclude, with perhaps very superficial eVidence, that here at last
is a complete psychology of learning which will give an adequate account of man's
mental, as well as his phYSical, activities.
It is an intriguing prospect that the theory of a semi-behaviorist might contain notions in any way akin to Scholastic thought in the area of human learning.
One cannot but wonder what there is about Tolman's theory - a Purpose Behaviorism, as he calls it - which causes even professional investigators to come to such
conclusions as these : " E. C. Tolman has formulated a theory less mechanistic than
Hull's and one which gives the organism more intellectual credit." 1
Even from the Scholastic psychologist, Kobler, there is the follOWing comment:
Tolman 's Sign-Significate theory of learning approximates more closely
a system that incorporates a suffiCient and adequate set of principles to
explain the complexities of human learning. It appears that by a blend
of nativism and behaviorism spiced with a touch of a slightly transmogrified unconsciousness we shall arrive at a palatable learning theory.
There is an approach to this in the system of Tolman and the persuasiveness of this system demonstrates the relationship between eclecticism
and common sense. 2
Are such conclusions justified by the theory itself, or are they just evidence of
the grave tendency of Tolman's language to be misinterpreted? Meehl and MacCorquodale, eminent learning psychologists, suggest the problematic nature of Tolman 's theory in saying:
... it is interesting to note a " philosophical " point about Tolman's
system which some of its opponents have perhaps dimly perceived. Tol-
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man himself explicitly disavows any dualistic reference for his "freshly
defined" words, and has for over thirty years insisted upon his consistent
behaviorism . . . . Nevertheless, there is a peculiar sense in which his
formulation has, willy-nilly, a certain affinity with the dualistic, or, as
he prefers to call it, "mentalistic" scheme. 3
The Gestaltist, Varvel, also comments on the linguistic problem in Tolman,
saying: "One will not always agree with Dr. Tolman's interpretations; and, worst
of all, one will never be quite certain that he fully understands Dr. Tolman's terminology." 4
Tolman himself admitted that he had stated his theory in a manner which
"seems to lend support to some sort of an ultimately teleological and ultimately
mentalistic interpretation of animal and human behavior," 5 although at the same
time he desired to disavow any type of mentalism. Admitting to the label "Behaviorist" in some respects, yet deSirous of being accepted into the fold of the Gestaltists,
Tolman is at once a uniquely interesting theorist, and an object of controversial
speculation.
£. C. Tolman can be known only by means of depth study of his voluminous
writings; the interpretation to be given his terminology cannot be found in secondary
sources where the treatment of the Sign-Gestalt theory is too brief to make the distinctions necessary to clarity, or to include Tolman's glossary of special meanings
as found in his chief work, PurpOSive B ehavior in Animals and Men.
BEHAVIORIST OR GESTALTIST?
Perusal of any representative list of works authored by E. C. Tolman will
reveal the frequent rec~rrence of the two terms " Behavioristic" and " Gestalt," and
will prompt the query : " Exactly what is Tolm an's position in psychology? "
Is Tolman a Behaviorist? If so, his surely is not the strict Behaviorism of
Watson. Tolman cannot be labelled a "stimulus-response psychologist, " for he goes
to great lengths to insist on the concept " molar," as opposed to " molecular" or
" atomistic" in his descriptions of behavior. He asserts emphatically that he wishes
to be set apart from tlle " muscle twitchism" of the Watsonian Behaviorism. 6 His
words on the point in 1926 were:
Behavior for me is not as it is for many, probably most behaviorists primarily a matter of mere muscle contraction and gland secretion,
of mere " motions, " that is, described as motions. I conceive behavior
rather as presenting a new and unique set of descriptive properties all
its own - new properties which, as such, can be described and known,
irrespective of whatever muscular or glandular activities underly them. 7
Indeed, Tolman 's terminology would have been highly unacceptable to the
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Watsonians. Such terms as "sensation," "perception," "purposive," and" cognitive,"
were classed as unscientific and subjective and necessarily to be purged from the
behaviorist's vocabulary.
Tolman makes frequent use of the terms "Gestalt" and " Sign-Gestalt" as descriptive of a certain feature of " wholeness" or "configuration" in behavior acts.
Yet his own declaration of himself as belonging to the "field theorist school" 8 and
his expressed desire to be admitted to the Gestaltist fold 9 are probably his closest
ties with Gestalt psychology.
A strain is put on the word " Gestaltist" in trying to fit Tolman under the implied characteristics. Analysis of the theory of wholeness central to both Tolman
and the Gestaltists brings into doubt the similarity of the two positions. Wertheimer's
pronouncements for the Gestaltists make it clear that the idea of "wholes" as merely
summative of parts - as a building up of larger wholes from elementary processes,
or of the " whole" conceived of as a mosaic, built up by simple additive juxtaposition, such as Tolman describes it, are unacceptable to the Gestaltists. Rather, the
"whole" is to be conceived, not only as more than its parts, but also as prior to its
parts, that is, it is logically as well as materially superordinate to them. 10
The term "Sign-Gestalt" used in Tolman's theory is subject to the criticism of
which Heidbreder warns when she says ':
The chief objection of Gestalt psychology to both behaviorism
and structuralism is to their practice of taking their material piecemeal,
of assuming that their larger units are nothing but smaller ones put
together in specifiC combinations. 11
That Tolman's theory of learning may be accused of this fault is evident in
his discussion of perception as a fusion of sign, significate, and signified-means-endrelations. 12 Or, of the learning process being "the building up of, or rather a refinement of, and correction in, the expectations of such specifiC sign, significate, and
signified means-end-relations-wholes, or ... sign-gestalts." 13 ObViously, there is no
sense to the word " fusion" if, as the Gestaltists hold, the whole is prior to the parts.
THE SIGN-GESTALT THEORY OF LEARNING
Tolman has called his theory a Sign-gestalt or sign-significate theory to set it
definitely apart from stimulus - response theories such as those of Thorndike and
Guthrie. Where these latter theories make learning a matter of correct movement
sequences in response to certain environmental or drive stimulations, Tolman contends that the learner follows signs to a goal, or makes a cognitive map which he
follows. What is learned is the relationship between the signs (the immediate environment) and the significate (the goal object). Criticizing stimulus-response theories,
he says:
Correct stimulus-response connections do not get" stamped in,"
and incorrect ones do not get " stamped out." Rather, learning consists
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in the organisms' "discovering " or " refining" what all the respective
alternative responses lead to.14
Evidence emerging from the experimentation of Blodgett, Williams, Herb, Elliott,
Honzik and from his own work, caused Tolman to reject "trial and error" theory
as unable to account for the complexities of the learning process. Rejection of the
Laws of Effect and Exercise which served as its foundation led also to rejection of
the theory itself. Similarly, Tolman came to reject the conditioned-reflex theory of
learning. His work with "experimental extinction, " reward expectancy, and place
learning led him to a more wholistic account for which he uses the term " Molar
behavior." What " molar behavior" actually means for Tolman is seen in the follOWing:
A rat running a maze; a cat getting out of a puzzle box; a man
driving home to dinner; a child hiding from a stranger; a woman doing
her washing or gossiping over a telephone .. . these are behaviors qua
molar. And it must be noted that in mentioning no one of them have
we referred to, or, we blush to confess it, for the most part even known,
what were the exact muscles and glands, sensory nerves, and motor
nerves involved. For these responses somehow had other sufficiently
identifying properties of their own .15
Tolman finds that while the initiating causes of behavior are environmental
stimuli and phYSiological states, these operate through behavior determinants, chief
among which are purpose and cognition. A broad over-view of the classes of behavior-determinants may prove helpful:
A. Independent Variables
1. Environmental Variables
2. Individual Difference Variables
B. Dependent Variable of Behavior
C. Intervening Variables
1. Immanent Purposive and Cognitive Determinants
2. Capacities
a . As ultimate, genetic and training factors
b. As immediate response requirements
3. Behavio~-Adjustments
a. Simple Ideation
b. Creative Ideation 16
Independent Variables. Independent variables are the initiating causes of the individ u ai's action. They
have to do with the environmental situation and with factors which motivate per-
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formance. The six environmental variables named by Tolman may be explained
briefly as follows:
1. Maintenance Schedule - concerns the time elapsed since food, water, sex,
and other drives were satisfied.
2. Appropriateness of the Goal Object - concerns the motivating strength of
the object provided as a goal, in relation to drive strengths.
3. Types and Modes of Stimuli Provided - these are variables in the features
of the environment itself, such as ability to visualize the goal-object; visual
stimuli, such as light to direct movement toward the goal, etc.
4. Types of Motor Response Required - whether this be running, jumping,
moving right or left, etc.
5. 2: (OBO) - a symbol representing the sum and nature of all the preceding
occasions in which the choice point Oc has, by virtue of certain behavior,
B, been followed by such and such stimulus-objects met enroute to the goal.
6. Pattern of Preceding and Succeeding Maze Units - the general pattern of
experience. I?
The Individual Difference variables are given as four, namely, heredity, age,
prior training, and endocrine, drug or vitamin conditions. Tolman suggests that
the number of these variables may be much greater than four, however.
Dependent Variable of Behavior. Behavior for Tolman, consists of responses which are combinations of verbal,
skeletal, and visceral reactions. Here the concern is with" action meanings," such as
" To consume food, "" put on a coat,"" go toward light, " etc. 18
Intervening Variables. These are" postulated explanatory entities conceived to be connected by one
set of causal functions to the independent variables on the one side, and by another
set of functions to the dependent variables of behavior on the other." 19 Faced with
the necessity of accounting for the multiple factors which influence learning, Tolman
has proposed series of intervening variables. The precise variables have not remained
fixed in his earlier and later discussions, but the differences are a matter of vocabulary more than anything else. The six variables of demand , appetite, differentiation,
motor skill, hypotheses, and biases, which he names in his 1938 discussion,20 can
be subsumed under the three broad categories of intervening variables cited in the
outline above, and presented by Tolman in his first book in 1932.
Immanent PurpOSive and Cognitive Determinants. Behavior as behavior, that is, as molar, is purposive and is cognitive. These purposes and cognitions are of its immediate descriptive warp
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and woof. And such purposes and such cognitions are just as evident
if this behavior be that of a rat or if it be tha t of a human being. 21
While Tolman describes purpose and cognition as " immanent" determinants
of behavior, it is evident that the accepted meaning of the term as descriptive of a
subjective or mentalistic event is not intended; " purpose," thus conceived is not related to philosophical teleology . Tolman means only to describe external, recognizable behavior, for he pOints out that the two significant features of " purpose" are :
( 1) the readiness of an organism to persist through trial and error; and (2 ) the fact
of its tendency on successive occasions to select sooner and sooner the act which gets
him out easily and qUickly .
" Cognition " is the second-named in1manent determinant of behavior in Tolman 's theory. It is defined in the Glossary thus: " A Cognition (a means-end readiness) or an expectation is present in behavior in so far as the continued gOing-off
of that behavior is contingent upon environmental entities proving to be ' so and

so.' " 22
Tolman maintains that an organism " expects" environmental conditions to be
such and such from past experience, and if these entities do not prove to be that
way, then the behavior-act will show disruption, and will be followed by subsequent
alteration. He uses the term " cognition " for this expectation. At no point does Tolman say that a human cognition or expectancy differs from that of animals; the
term seems limited to expectancy of that which is rem emb ered to have been p erceived
and behaved to before.
Capacities. " Capacities are the endowments of the individual or the species which result
from innate endowment and past training. ,, 23 These are of two types, ultimate genetic
and training factors, of which Tolman postulates some thousand or more, and " immediate response requirements," of which he specifies five types. These range from
discriminanda capacity (sensory discrimination), manipulanda capacity (motor discrimination ), means-ends-capacity (ability to build up correct Sign-gestalt expectations ), retentivity (capacity for correct mnemoniz ations ), to consciousness ability,
which is simply an overt running-back-and-forth, directed toward actually trying out
all the alternatives in an attempt to reach the goal. 24
Behavior-Adjustments. It has just been stated that a sampling, or running-back-and-forth behavior
was termed "consciousness " by Tolman. Behavior-adjustments are related to "consciousness " in th at they represent a " behavior-feint" a t sampling behavior. "To
behavior-adjust, " says Tolman, " is in some strange way to be brought into contact
with the same stimulus-results that one would be in contact With , if one should ac-
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tually behave." 25
Such behavior-feints are also termed "ideations" by Tolman, and although
he would not approve of this terminology, he seems to be describing a process similar to thought in the human person, where one may review many alternative procedures mentally, without ever performing any of them. Tolman attributes ideation to
some innate trait or aptitude of the organism, but denies that there is any" inner
stuff" or "mentalistic" interpretation involved. 26 The exact nature of the term "ideation" is never further clarified in his works.
The term "creative ideation" is distinguished from simple ideation by the fact
that it involves the doing of some really new act, never performed before. In creative
or inventive ideation the organism achieves a "behavior-adjustment" to a "meansend field" which, as such, he has never actually encountered. Just what is involved
in this is stated thus:
... this ideation can be divided into: (a) a moment of simple ideation
(running-back-and-forth in "adjustment" form) over the differentiations
and predictions already at the animal's command and involved in the
trials and errors which he has already been taking; (b) a moment of
the appearance of really new ideations, i.e., a moment in which the animal suddenly begins to run back and forth in adjustment form over
paths and strands (differentiations and predictions) in the field to which,
in the given situation, he has previously been insensitive. 27
SOME PRACTICAL EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS IN TOLMAN

On the basis of its theoretical position regarding the nature and capabilities of
man, a learning theory must supply a definition of learning. Contemporary psychology
errs on the side of superfluity in this respect, for there are scores of definitions of
learning, none of which has become uniformly accepted, and few of which are litde
more than descriptions of observable behavior. Hilgard expresses the general attitude in this matter, saying:
A precise definition of learning is not necessary, so long as we
agree that the inference to learning is made from changes in performance
that are a result of training and experience, as distingUished from changes
such as growth or fatigue and from changes attributable to the temporary state of the learner. 28
This emphasis on learning as a "change in performance," and as "adaptive
activity" is inherent also in Tolman's statements about learning, for example when
he says:
The term learning ... refers to the phenomenon whereby an in-
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dividual discovers that a given type of behavior, or a given type of
social technique, is, in a given environment set-up, instrumental to the
satisfaction of his more fundamental group of drives. The results of
learning are thus closely dependent upon the actual environmental conditions .... Learning is thus a " reasonable activity " which tends to
keep the individual well-adjusted to the actual environmental realities. 29
Or, more briefly, and in his own distinctive terminology: " Learning is an affair of
sign-gestalt formation, refinement, selection or invention. " 30
In his 1932 formulations Tolman provides laws for three broad types of learning, namely, conditioned reflex learning, trial and error, a nd inventive ideation.
While he has referred to a difference in the degree of learning capacity in men and
in animals, it has never been clear that he distinguished a difference in kind of learning capacity. Tolman has made such statements as these:
It has become strikingly evident that differences of capacity obtain as
between different species. The higher the species, the more extensive and
complicated and " highbrow" the types of field-relationship to which
the individuals are sensitive.31
and
The higher the animal, the more it would seem that these representations (of ends of acts) can be played with and manipulated; the more
the animal can mentally add and subtract the acts to produce new representations; the more, in short, he can achieve " foresight, " as opposed
to trial and error solutions. 32
The notion of "hitting upon some new aspect of the field, " exemplified by Tolman in citing the case of the ape, Sultan, and his" creative action of thinking of
pushing a stick used ' as rake rather than of pulling it," 33 although called inventive
ideation or inSight learning by Tolman does not qualify as more than a perceptual
organization and hardly prOVides for a properly human mode of learning such as
one would hope for in a complete psychology of learning. If " inventive ideation" or
" purely sitting and thinking behavior" are modes of action of which Kohler 's apes
are capable, then these notions are not broad enough to describe human learning
of the intellectual type.
The cognitions of human beings are far from exhausted in Tolman 's explanations. Human beings, even when forced into "trial-and-error " or " conditioning "
situations, will attempt to reason, interpret, and understand them. They will indeed
make maps of the situation, but they will be more than Visual, tactual, or auditory
in nature, although these will also be present. As Fr. Gasson, S.J. , remarks :
For human beings the cognitive union reaches those aspects of
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objects and persons in which the individual can find his own proper
enhancement. The human being is interested in food, but also in table
manners. He is interested in a mate, but also in friendship . The human
being must possess a distinctive capacity for assimilating these nonmaterial aspects of his environment in a cognitive way. 34
Laws of Learning in Tolman 's Theory. The first group of laws are referred to as "Laws Relative to the Nature of the
Material to Be Learned," and include the following :
a. Togetherness
b. Fusibility
c. Other gestalt-like laws
d . Interrelations among the spatial, temporal, and other characters of the altern ativ es.
e. Characters in the material favoring new closures and expansions of the field .
Evidence supporting the laws of "Togetherness" and " Fusibility" has been building
up for over thirty-five years in psychological literature. When parts are seen by the
learner to belong together in some way, there is a greater possibility of achieving a
generalization, which as Professor Irion points out, " may be retained with little or
no loss for considerable periods of time. " 35
" Other gestalt-like laws" include laws of " closure" and of " good continuation"
as found in Wertheimer and Koflka. The law of closure might be called an alternative to the law of effect, for in much the same way tha t rewards were claimed to
influence learning by bringing the actor to the goal, so also closure acts as a kind
of reward insofar as it represents a completion of something, which brings its own
satisfaction, and is probably more appropriate to the human learner than is the
law of effect.
The human tendency toward closure, if not prolonged unduly, can serve as
motivation to the spirit of " wonder " and inquiry. Experiments by Lewin, Prentice,
and Rosenweig indicate tllat a higher degree of retention is had when interruption
occurs before the activity has been brought to completion. Subjects studied had better
recollection of the names of incomplete than of complete tasks . 35
Satisfaction in completion (closure) can serve also to assist in motivating students to achieve mastery in prior learning levels before attempting subsequent, more
difficult steps.
The second group of laws is related to the manner of presentation of the material to be learned:
a. Frequency, recency
b. Revival after extinction, distributed repetition, etc.
c. Motivation
d. EmphaSiS
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e. Temporal order and sequences in the presentation of alternatives

f. Temporal relations between presentation of certain of the already given alternatives and the true solution.
Tolman's formulations on frequency and recency as factors in learning include
a notion omitted by other theorists, as is expressed in these words: " The more frequently and more recently the actual sequence of sign, means-end-relation and significate have been presented, the stronger, other things being equal, this resulting signgestalt will tend to be. " 36 Repetition and recency, then, are not enough; Tolman
would say that these qualities are effective only in a situation favorable to sign-gestalt
formation. Repetition of isolated facts is less effective for learning than is repetition
of meaningful, related materials.
One of the most interesting of Tolman's contributions to learning theory is his
Law of Emphasis. He states it thus:
By a Law of Emphasis we would mean the assumption that learning consists in building up little patterns or gestalts in which the correct
response is set over against the incorrect one ... and that an accent
or emphasis upon the correct res p 0 n s e s will tend to favor learning;
whereas an accent or emphasis upon the wrong responses will tend to
hinder learning. 37
Muenzinger reached a similar conclusion:
We found that electric shock for the right response was as effective
as shock for the wrong response and that either was decidedly more
effective than learning without shock. 38
There are a variety of conclusions to be drawn from these findings, one of
which might be an argument of a moderate level of tension or anxiety to be created
by the teacher in the pupil, in connection with matters she wishes to emphasize. It
may be desirable to consider ways in which motivation may be coordinated with
the Law of Emphasis. Perhaps agreement can be had with Lindgren's statement that,
Inasmuch as learning involves change, and change means abandoning
old patterns of behavior for new ones, it is evident that some anxiety
will be aroused if learning is to take place. 39
Motivation . Like most contemporary psychologists, Tolman describes motivation in animal
terms as" any phYSiological state which makes the animal active and exploratory. ,,40
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A drastic change occurred in Tolman's early position (1932) on motivation, where
he maintained that "learning without any very obvious motivation can occur," 41 and
that only some general motivation of curiosity was found.
It was a wiser Tolman who, in 1947, retracted this unusual contention, saying:
I used to be so impressed by the latent learning experiments that
I was apt to formulate conditions .. . of frequency alone as if motivation
played no role. However, if I did this, I was in error. It is obvious
that unmotivated animals will not learn. They will go to sleep or otherwise divorce themselves from the task . . . . It appears that motivation
conditions are very important for the building up of field expectancies.42
In his later writings, Tolman employs such Freudian terms as "id," "superego, "
and " enlarged ego" demands as related to motivation, emphasizing the notion that
values are culturally determined . He was never able to separate values from the
framework of "incentive objects " which bring " drive disturbances" to quiescence.
The goal object itself which might ordinarily be associated with motivation was described by Tolman as " a demanded to-be-got-to (or to-be-got-from) internal physiological condition or external environmental object." 43
There is some inconsistency in Tolman 's rejection of Thorndike 's Law of Effect,
on the other hand, and the statement of an appetite-aversion theory of motivation,
on the other. This latter theory seems to call for reward a nd punishment as motivators, for if one values only those things which relieve drive-disturbance, then motivation will center around the satisfaction of animal-level wants, such as one might
prOVide for a child, in the form of pleaSing objects for his consumption. In the classroom situation, such a child may perform required tasks in order to avoid sanctions,
or to attain some tangible reward.
There is, however, ample evidence that children can be appealed to on higher
levels than these, and that such motives as the sheer joy of learning, interest, and
even love of God, are found.
Transfer. In sea rching for Tolman 's meaning of transfer of training, one is referred by
the Glossary to " means-end-readiness," which, it will be recalled is a " judgment
that commerce-with such and such a ' type' of means-object should lead on by such
and such direction-distance relations to some instance of the given demanded type
of goal-object." 44 The relation of tra nsfer of learning to this " what leads to what"
notion is explained by Tolman thus: " It is the carrying over of such means-endreadinesses from one situation to another which constitutes the so-called phenomenon
of 'transfer' of training." 45
What is said to account for this " carrying over"? Surprisingly enough, Tolman is found using Gengerelli's term " generalized habit"- a term for which the
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student of Tolman is totally unprepared. In context, used as descriptive of rat behavior, the terms "generalized habit, " as well as the " abstracting of the goodness
of right-turning from one maze to another," 46 are seen for what they really are examples of perceptions of certain means-ends situations as similar. There is no
need to postulate anything beyond the sensory level powers to account for the " preferential behavior" of a rat for right-turns in a second maze when it has learned
right turning in a first maze.
This same observation can be made in regard to the terms " cognitive" and
"judgmental," which Tolman uses to describe these means-end-readinesses. "They
are, " he says, "of the nature of preliminary ' hunches' which the rat brings with him
to any new problem. They are means-end judgments resulting from innate endowment and previous experience, which he carries around with him as a silent partner
wherever he goes." 47
Tolman 's contribution to transfer theory includes the notion of a building up
of narrow striplike or relatively broad and comprehenSive cognitive maps. The narrow map presents a Simple connection between the stimulus and the goal; the comprehensive map proVides a representation of a wider arc of the environment so that
varieties of response may be introduced. What this means for transfer theory, in
Tolman's words is this:
The differences between such strip maps and such comprehensive maps
will appear only when the rat (or man) is later presented with some
change within the given environment. Then the narrower and more striplike the original map, the less will it carryover successfully to the new
problem; whereas, the wider and the more comprehensive it was, the
more adequately it will serve in the new set-up. 48
The question of how to induce these desired broad , comprehensive maps may be
inferred from Tolman's discussion of the causes of narrow strip maps. The latter
seem to be induced (1) by a damaged brain; (2) by an inadequate array of enVironmentally presented cues; (3) by an overdose of repetitions on original trainedon paths; and (4) by the presence of too strongly motivational or of too strongly
frustrating conditions. 49
Each of these considerations can make some contribution to transfer in human
learning, in spite of the fact that Tolman does not deal with the intellectual factors
involved.
Although Floyd Allport 50 suggests that Tolman's theory goes beyond the limitations of Thorndike's identical elements theory of transfer, one might make a case
demonstrating the dependency of Tolman 's transfer theory on similarity of per ceptual wholes or "sign-gestalt-readinesses" in a first and second situation. 5 1
Critique. Critical materials related to Tolman 's work are very few in number. At least
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two causes of this dearth suggest themselves : first, many psychologists are unwilling
to admit of commitment to some definitive philosophical position from which to evaluate a theory such as Tolman 's; second, the formidable language problem discourages
many from attempting to unravel his terms to get at the meanings . It would seem,
however, that in spite of all obstacles, the researcher must accept the challenge to
formulate a type of critique of the predominant notions found in Tolman 's theory,
and note some of the implications such a theory may have for educational practice.
It has been seen that Purposivist and Gestaltist tendencies in Tolman 's theory
lose out to Behaviorism in his concept of reality and of the nature of man. Man
emerges from Tolman's writings as a high level animal in such words as:
Man's houses and heating systems, his clothes, airplanes, governments,
religions, and bombs are, we must assume, to be ultimately explained
as but complicated outgrowths of those same biological drives and social
techniques which have been demonstrated in the rat, the chimpanzee, the
monkey, or the hen. 52
Whatever may be his exact meaning when employing such terms as " creative
ideation, " and "the purely sitting and thinking behavior of apes," it is certain that
Tolman h as intended to make no essential distinction between brutes and men, e.g.,
" The reason why the human being and the ape excel the rat and the cat may lie,
not so much in the greater means-end-capacities of the former per se, as in their
superior sensory equipments." 53
To say that a rat forms " hypotheses " or makes " deliberate choices " in a maze;
to call the behavior of a chimpanzee a " reasonable activity," or to remark of Kohler's
apes that they had " inSight" into the means-end relations of a problem given them,
or that they demonstrated a "conscious grasping" of field-relationships; to class as
" abstraction " certain transferred behavior of the rat; to describe as " cognitive" or
" purposive" the searching behavior of a rat when certain " expected" goals were absent; to speak of " judgment" when referring to an animal 's behavioral response to
certain environmental stin1Uli, or of the " cognitive, appreciative, and moral value
plaCings of men and lower animals " - such are examples of the language meaning
problems encountered in Tolman's theorizing.
Magda Arnold says of Tolman:
Tolman not only credits the rat with hypotheses but with practically
every other human function as well . . . . To say that the animal came
to such conclusions is to credit him (without any eVidence) with the
ability to form concepts and to reason syllogistically. To think that a
psychologist can escape the reproach of anthropomorphism if he ascribes
reasoning to animals but protests at the same time that human reasoning is not really syllogistic reasoning either, is to presume on the objective status of his brand of psychology. 54
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If Tolman has not generalized from his observations of animal behavior to
human learning, his language would still be open to criticism in that he would be
borrowing terms descriptive of human capabilities and applying them to sub-humans.
The problem at hand is more serious than that, however, for when he entitles his
major work Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men, the reader, coming upon such
temlS as "cognition," "inference," "ideation," "abstraction," "universals, " etc. erroneously believes that Tolman is dealing with characteristically human learning
phenomena and does not readily adjust his thinking to new meanings for familiar
terms. Articles authored by Tolman and appearing in journals unaccompanied by
his Glossary of speCial meanings, are utterly misleading to the student of learning
theory . It would require a speCialized knowledge of Tolman's unique vocabulary to
read his works with the meanings he intends to give them, and this the student does
not have.
Tolman is aware of the dilemma his language presents, for he remarks:
Actually, I have used these terms "purpose" and "cognition; ' and
the various derivatives and synonyms I have coined, in a purely neutral
and objective sense. Yet I know that, in spite of tllis fact, most readers
will persist in belieVing that I mean by " purposes" and "cognitions"
entities ultimately subjective in character and metaphYSically teleological
in import. I can but hope that all such readers will read and reread the
glossary. 55

As a contribution to the psychology of learning, Tolman 's theory, like most
contemporary learning theories, suffers from narrowness and inadequacy when applied to the total learning behavior observable in man. It is a theory based on the
" learning" behavior of rats, and no matter how adequate for rats, will be necessarily inadequate for human beings. The higher level human powers, evidence for
which is ample in the acts and products of human intelligence, creativity and will
power, are neglected in the Sign-Gestalt theory.
Tolman 's more recent tendency to borrow terminology from Lewin's topological
field theory probably represents an attempt to adjust his formulations to a more
exact framework in response to the critics who abhor the lack of precision in the
statement of his laws and in the language of the theory. This turning to physical
science to prOVide explanations of human behavior is criticized by Sister Annette
Walters:
Every natural science that deals with man must of necessity be a
science of a part of man only . ... We must avoid borrOWing terms
from the natural sciences, such as " vectors," " fields of force, " " tension
systems, " " homeostasis," and perhaps even "dynamiCS." 56
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Gasson, S.J., strongly protests in these words :

If we try to build a psychodynamics as we do a thermodynamics
or hydrodynamics, we are forced to do one of two things: We must
either assume that the person is a system of particles in a field in exactly
the same way as the bodies of physics, and that means resurrecting the
old atomistic mechanism ... , or we must find correlates in the person
for the particles and forces that are the elements of physical dynamic
systems but which behave in an entirely different way . 57
While Tolman's theory does not mark a real milestone in the progress of the
psychology of learning, it probably represents the transition stage in the departure
from strict mechanism to the broad field theory approach . The student of Tolman 's
theory cannot deny having had a valuable experience.
In summary, it is clear from the consideration given to Tolman 's definitions
and to his unique word " creations" that only objective, behavioristic meanings are
provided for, and that all mentalistic reference is rejected. Terms, Scholastic in tone,
are not Scholastic in meaning.
It may also be concluded that the theory itself, under careful examination, does
not justify the conclusions of those who have judged it (evidently from the terminology
alone ) to be a close approximation to an adequate human learning theory - even
claiming that it gave man "more intellectual credit" than other existing theories.
Such a statement is evidence of the tendency of Tolman 's language to be misinterpreted
when unaccompanied by his Glossary of terms.
Finally, Tolman 's formulations in the four areas of Learning and Forgetting,
Motivation, Individual Differences, and Transfer of Training are seen to contribute
the following important notions, on the practical level, to the psychology of learning:
(a) A recognition that there is more than one kind of learning, with formulations
which account for six types of relationships that get learned.
( b) The formulation of Capacity Laws in recognition of the fact that provision
must be made in the body of the theory for the adjustment of learning to the individual differences as known.
( c) The postulation of " broad cognitive maps" as opposed to " narrow striplike maps " as a Gestalt-like principle most conducive to bringing about the desired
transfer of training.
( d) Provision for a " moderate" motivation as contributory to mental health in
the school situation, as well as a suggested antidote for social ills.
(e ) Formulation of the Law of Emphasis to replace Thorndike's Law of Effect,
recognizing that not just that which is rewarded, but that whatever is emphasi<ed
is learned.
( f ) Recognition through the Latent Learning experiments of the importance of
" learning by discovery" and the necessity for preserving the natural curiosity of the
learner.
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(g) Suggestions for methodological procedure, particularly in subordinating
mechanical, memoriter and drill procedures of learning to "patterned " and "organized wholes" in the presentation of materials to be learned.
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